Recent Cases by Editors,
RECENT CASES.
ALIEN-RIGHIT TO SUE ALTHOUGH INTERNED--A German born resident,
registered according to law as an alien enemy, entered into a contract with
a native born resident, and was shortly afterwards interned. Held: He
may sue for a breach of contract as such restraint per se does not make him
an alien ex lege. Shaffhims v. Goldberg, z13 L. T. 949 (Eng. 1915).
Whether an alien can sue or not depends upon his residence and business
domicile and not upon his nationality. Re Mary Duchess of Sutherland, 31
Times L Rep. 394 (Eng. '9i5); Wolf & Son v. Carr, Parker & Co., Ltd.,
139 L. T. Jour. 24 (Eng. 1915). Before an alien enemy resident can. sue,
in war time, he must show that he is in the country by license of the
sovereign. Princess of Thurn and Taxis v. Moffitt, 112 L. T. Rep. 114 (Eng.
1915). But registration as an alien enemy, as required by law, is sufficient
evidence of such license. Porter v. Freudenberg, 112 L. T. Rep. 313 (Eng.
1915). A prisoner of war is likewise under the protection of the sovereign
and is not ex lege. Sparenburgh v. Bannatyne, i Bost. & P. 163. (Eng.
1797). But an interned alien enemy has no right by means of a writ of
habcas corpus to question the authority of the sovereign so to intern him.
Rex v. Supt. of Vine Street Police Sta.; ex parte Liebmann, 113 L T. Rep.
971 (Eng. i915).
In the United States, the general rule is that an alien enemy cannot
sue in our courts. Wilcox v. Henry, i U. S. 69 (1782); Mumford v. Mum-
ford, Fed. Cas. No. 9918 (1812); Johnson v. Thirteen Bales, etc., Fed. Cas.
No. 7415 (1832). However, the right of action is only suspended during
the continuance of the war. Jackson v. Decker, Ii Johns 418 (N. Y. x814).
But an alien enemy, resident here by license of the government, may main-
tain a personal action. Otteridge v. Thompson, Fed. Cas. No. io,618 (1814);
Parkinson v. Wentworth, ii Mass. 26 (1814). And this license will be im-
plied from the absence of an order to depart, even where the action is not
personal. Clarke v. Morey, io Johns 69 (N. Y. 1813). But a resident
citizen of one belligerent nation cannot maintain an action in the courts
of the other. Bell v. Chapman, ro Johns 183 (N. Y. x813); Bishop t.
Jones, 28 Tex. 294 (i866).
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-COMPROMISE OF ACTIoN-AUTHORITY OF AT-
TORNF-The attorney of one of a large number of. creditors signed a com-
position agreement for 20 per cent. in ignorance of the fact that his client
had given instructions not to settle for less than ioo per cent. Held: The
creditor could recover the full amount of the claim from his debtor. Ham-
berger et al. v. White, x54 Pac. 576 (Okl. z916).
The general rule is that an attorney has not, without authority from
his client, the power to compromise a cause of action, either pending or to
be instituted. Gray v. Howell, 205 Pa. 211 (9o3); Miocene Ditch Co. v.
Moore, ISo Fed. 483 0907). An attorney certainly cannot bind his client
(747)
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by any unauthorized act which amounts to a total or partial surrender of a
substantial right. Pomeroy v. Prescott, io6 Me. 401 (xgio). The general
rule also prohibits an attorney from receiving, in the absence of authority
from his client, a sum less than that actually due in satisfaction of his
client's claim. Sonneborn v. Moore, io5 Ga. 497 (1898); Schreiber v. Straus,
147 Ill. App. 58t (09o9). And this is especially so where it has been
previously reduced to the form of a judgment or decree. Housenick v.
Miller, 93 Pa. 514 (i88o) ; Smith v. Jones, 47 Neb. io8 (1896). The prin-
cipal case is in accord with the general rule that where the attorney has
express directions from the client not to dnter into a compromise, then, of
course, the client is not bound by the arrangement. Fray v. Voules, I El. &
E. 839 (Eng. 1859); Dalton v. West End R. Co., i59 Mass. 221 (1893). But
an unauthorized compromise may, of course, be ratified. Beagles v. Robert-
son, 135 Mo. App. 3o6 (igo8); Reid v. Dickinson, 37 Iowa 56 (1873).
-BILLS AND NOTFs-HOLDER IN DUE COURSE-NOTICE OF INFIRMITY IN
INSTRtu.SET-A bank purchased a negotiable note with no actual knowledge
of a defence which did actually exist, but with knowledge of certain facts
which would have put a prudent man on guard. Held: The bank was negli-
gent in failing to make proper investigation and was not a holder in due
course. Boxell v. Bright National Bank of Flora., ito N. E. 982 (Ind. i916).
While there are two views on this subject, the greater number of
jurisdictions are now in accord that circumstances which would excite the
suspicion of a prudent man are not sufficient to put the purchaser of a
negotiable instrument on inquiry. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 Howard 367
(U. S. 1857); Bradwell v. Pryor, 221 IIl. 6o2 (1906). Therefore the prin-
cipal case is contra to the general rule. It indorses the so-called "doctrine
of Gill v. Cubitt," 3 Barn. & C. 466 (Eng. 1824). The latter case was soon
reversed in England, being ruled against in Crook v. Jadis, 5 Barn & Ad.
9o (1834) ; and finally completely reversed by Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad.
& Ell. 87o (Eng. 1836). This latter case held in accord with what is now
the majority rule in America that there must exist bad faith to overthrow
the title of a holder in due course. Custard v. Hodges, i55 Mich. 361 (igog) ;
Rice v. Barrington, 7o A. i69 (N. J. i9O8). Even gross negligence will not
defeat one's title if it does not amount to bad faith. Goodman v. Harvey,
supra. However, it has been held that the purchaser must not wilfully
shut his eyes to the means of knowledge which he knows are at hand.
Goodman v. Simonds, supra. The doctrine of the principal case is well
established in Indiana. Sclmuneckle v. Waters, 125 Ind. 265 (i89o); State
Bank of Greentown v. Lawrence, 177 Ind. 515 (gio). Other states in
accord with Gill v. Cubitt, supra, and the principal case, at common law
are Vermont and New Hampshire. Pierson v. Huntington, 82 Vt. 132; Bank
v. Ryder, 58 N. H. 512 (879).
The majority rule has influenced in similar proportions the negotiable
instruments statutes. A few states have incorporated in their acts the
minority doctrine of Gill v. Cubitt. Rockford v. Barrett, 22 S. D. 83 (198) ;
Brick Co. v. Jackson, 59 S. E. 92 (19o7). The statute passed recently in
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Indiana has repudiated the minority view and the principal case would have
been expressly decided the other way had not the institution of suit been
prior to the passage of the act. See Indiana Acts, 1913, p. 129, Art. IV.
CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION-PRE-EXISTINcG DImwr-One who obtained title
to real estate by fraud conveyed it to a third person in discharge of a pre-
existing debt. Held: The grantee was a "purchaser for value" Sutton
v. Ford, 87 S. E. 799 (Ga. x916).
It is now generally held that one who takes a transfer of a negotiable
instrument in payment of or to secure an antecedent debt ranks as a pur-
chaser of value. Bigelow Co. v. Automatic Gas Co., 1o7 N. Y. Supp. 894
(19o7) ; Graham v. Smith, i5 Mich. 65 (i9o8) ; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters i
(U. S. 1842). But there is a split of jurisdictions where property other
than negotiable instruments is so transferred. The principal case is in
accord with those cases, holding thiat a bona fide purchaser of property
for an antecedent debt constitutes the vendee a purchaser for value.
Schlister v. Harvey, 65 Cal. x58 (i884); Adams v. Vanderbeck, 148 Ind.
92 (1896); Harris v. Evans, j34 Ga. j6I (igog). Contra, Furman v. Rapelje,
67 11. App. 31 (j896); Ross v. Hodges, 157 S. WV. 391 (Ark. 1913). Some
decisions have drawn a distinction between one who takes a transfer of
property as security for the payment of a pre-existing debt and one who
takes an absolute conveyance in payment of the indebtedness due, holding
the transferee to be a purchaser for value in the latter case, but not in the
former. State Bank v. Frame, 112 O. 502 (1892).
CORPORATIONS-FAILURE To RECORD CIIARTER-RIGIIT To BRING SUIT-
A corporation had failed to record its certificate of incorporation in the
Recorder of Deed's office, as required by the Pennsylvania Act of April
29, 1874, P. L. 73, but had otherwise been duly organized and had assumed
corporate powers. The company later came into the hands of a receiver.
l eld: The receiver could maintain a suit at law for a debt due to the
company. Schmitt, Receiver of the Interstate Lumber Company v. Potter
Title & Trust Company, 61 Pa. Super. Ct. 301 (915).
It is difficult to define a de facto corporation, or to. lay down all the
elements essential to constitute one. In Re Gibbs, 157 Pa. 59 (z893), the
court said: "It is an apparent corporate organization, asserted to be a
corporation by its members, and actually acting as such, but lacking the
creative fiat of the law." More complicated definitions are given by the
courts of other jurisdictions. Methodist, etc., Church v. Pickett, 19 N. Y.
482 (1859); Society Perun v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 48 (885); Allen v.
Long, 8o Tex. 261 (i89i) ; Hasselman v. United States Mortg. Co., 97 Ind.
365 (i885). What one court has considered to be an essential element of
a corporation de facto, another court will entirely ignore, so that it is well
nigh hopeless to attempt to harmonize all the judicial definitions. The
court in the principal case considers three things as necessary to the exist-
ence of a corporation de facto: (I) a law under which it is alleged
to have been created; (2) an attempt to organize under the law; and (J) an
assumption and exercise of corporate powers under such attempted or-
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ganization. The court apparently disregards bona fides as a necessary ele-
ment, although the majority of decisions make good faith essential. Tulare
Jrr. Dist. v. Shepard, j85 U. S. i (19o1), Johnston v. Okerstran, 7o Minn.
303 (1897); Jones v. Aspen Hardware Co., 21 Colo. 263 (j85). See
Thompson: Corporations, 2nd Ed., Vol. r, Sec. 239. Assuming that an
association is a corporation de facto, it is universally held that its existence
cannot be attacked collaterally. Commonwealth v. Monongahela Bridge Co.,
216 Pa. io8 (9o6) ; Georgia, etc., Rwy." Co. v. Mercantile Trust, etc., Co.,
94 Ga. 3o6 (1893); Keyes v. Smith, 67" N. J. L 19o (igo).
Aside from the question whether the plaintiff was or was not a corpora-
tion de facto, it has been decided that the appointment of a receiver to
wind up the affairs of a corporation is conclusive of all prior matters in-.
volved in such appointment, so that the failure to record the certificate of
incorporation could under no circumstances be inquired into at the instance
of the defendant in the principal case. Capital, etc., Insurance Co. v.
Boggs, 172 Pa. 91 (i895) ; French v. Harding, 235 Pa. 79 (1912).
DaEnrs-CoxsTRucTro.--ExcFEPTroNs AND REsEavATIos-The owner of
a large farm sold the property, reservhig a family burying ground, con-
taining about one-fourth of an acre, with the right of free ingress and
egress. Subsequently the only bodies buried were removed with the con-
sent of the grantees. Held: The burying ground did not belong absolutely to
the grantor, but the grantor was merely entitled to use it for the specified
purpose, and having abandoned, could not grant the land to third persons.
Bradley v. Va. Ry. Co., 87 S. E. 721 (Va. 1916).
At common law the purpose and effect of an exception was to ex-
clude from the operation of the conveyance some part of the property
covered by the general words of description, it being always something
actually existenft. Co. Litt. 2ta; Sheppard's Touchstone, 77 ct seq.;" Wash-
ington Mfg. Co. v. Comm. Fire Ins. Co., 13 Fed. 646 (1882). A reservation
on the. other hand was a clause by which the grantor reserved to himself
some new thing issuing out of the thing granted, and not in esse before.
Co. Litt. 47a; Doe d. Douglas v. Lock, 2 Adol. & E. 743 (Eng. 1835). Since
an exception is in effect merely a part of the description of the thing
granted, no words of inheritance are necessary in order that the grantor
may retain the same estate in the thing excepted as he had before. But
since a reservation creates a thing not before h esse, it must contain words
of inheritance, in those jurisdictions where the common law rule prevails.
Co. Lit. 47a, 215b; Ashc'roft v. Eastern R. Co., 126 Mass. 196 (i879);
Whitaker v. Brown, 46 Pa. 197 (1863). But in the United States very gen-
erally the logical and historical significance of these terms has been lost
sight of, and they are used almost interchangeably, or rather the courts,
without regard to the particular terms used in the conveyance, construe the
language as an exception or reservation, according to the character of right
intended to be created thereby. Minor on Real Property, p. 122; Tiffany on
Real Property; Engel v. Ayer, 85 Me. 453 (i893); White v. N. Y. & N. F.
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R. Co., 156 Mass. 181 (1892). The principal case is in accord with this rule
which makes the intent of the parties, rather than the words ."exception"
or "reservation" the determining factor in ascertaining what estate is
preserved.
INTOXICATING LiQUoR-Vnvous OR SPIRITuous LiQUORs-BER-Under a
statute authorizing an injunction against persons who may sell or give
away any vinous or spirituous liquors unlawfully, one who sells beer, can-
not be enjoined though the beer contains alcohol. Beer is neither a vinous
nor a spirituous liquor. Collotta v. State, 7o So. 46o (Miss. 1916).
In deciding what liquors are included in the term "vinous liquors," the
courts are united in holding that beer is not such. Tinker v. State, go Ala.
647 (189); Sarlls v. United States, 152 U. S. 570 (i892). So when there
is an indictment for selling vin6us liquors, proof that beer was the liquor
sold. is a fatal variance. Feldman v. City of Morrison, 1 Ill. App. 46o
(1877). So alcohol is not a vinotts liquor within the meaning of the statute.
State v. Martin, 34 Ark. 34o (i88o).
That beer is not embraced within the term "spirituous liquors" has been
generally held. Fritz v. State, 6o Tenn. z5 (1875); Its re McDonough, 49
Fed. 36o (1892); Gwadinger v. CoM., 4 Ky. Law Rep. 5r4 (1883). But
there is some authority contra. State v. Brown, 51 Conn. I (188); State
v. Giersh, 98 N. C. 72o (i887). Beer is within the meaning of a statute
prohibiting the sale of "strong and spirituous liquors." Tompkins County
v. Taylor, 2r N. Y. 173 (188o). The term "spirituous liquors" includes all
liquors that are distilled as opposed to fermented, and which contain alcohol.
State v. Reiley, 66 N. J. Law, 399 (r9oi); State v. Thompson, 2o W. Va.
674 (i89o). So wine, hard cider, and ale are not spirituous liquors. State
v. Moore, 5 Blackf. zz8 (Ind. i87o). But wine has been so held. Jones
v. Surprise, 64 N. H. 243 (1886). Alcohol itself is not a spirituous liquor.
Semly v. State, 69 Miss. 628 (1892); State v. Martin, 34 Ark. 340 (188o),
though this case is annulled by Winn v. State, 43 Ark. 151 (1892).
The words "intoxicating liquors," when used in a statute are generally
held to include all spirituous, vinous and malt li~tuors. So beer is included
tinder this term. State v. Billups, 63 Ore. 277 (1912) ; State v. Dick, 47 Minn.
375 (1892); State v. Heinze, 45 Mo. App. 403 (i89i). In most cases the
court will take judicial notice that beer is intoxicating. Hloughland v. Can-
field, i6O Fed. 146 (1908); State v. Mitchell, 134 Mo. App. 54o (i9o8).
In other cases where a sale of beer is shown the court implies that it was
intoxicating liquor, State v. Ramsy, 63 Or. 29 (T913). In other States
beer is presumed to be intoxicating and the burden is on the defendant
to show otherwise. State v. May, 52 Kan. 53 (1894) ; State v. Durr, 69 W.
Va. 251 (igiz).
MASTER AND SERVANT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-INSPECTION OF APPu-
ANCEs-A rule of a company required workmen to examine personally all
appliances used by them. A workman was seriously injured by a defect in
part of the equipment customarily used for the purpose to which he was
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putting it. Held: The rule merely required the workman to make such
examination as would discover defects open to ordinary observatiori and
not to search for hidden defects; it was the master's duty to make the
appliances reasonably safe for the use of the workmen. St. Louis Ry. Co.
v. Gilley, 18i S. W. 918 (Ark. i916).
This is in accord with the general doctrine that the master is bound
to use reasonable care in supplying a safe place and safe means of work.
Wood, Master & Servant, § 329 ff. McCormick Co. v. Wojciechowski, Ixn
IlL. App. 641 (904); Gray v. Commutator Co., 85 Minn. 463 (i9O2). Many
courts, however, do not apply this. rule to simple tools. Lynn v. Glucose
Co., 128 Ia. 5o (igo5)-; Smith v. Fuel Co., Tog N. Y. S. 45 (i9o8). While
others take the view that a defect in a simple tool must be obvious to the
servant, and the master is relieved of liability. 3 Labatt, Master & Servant,
§ 924a; Webster Co. v. Nisbet, 205 I1. 273 (i9O3); Lukovski v. Mich. Cent.
Ry., 164 Mich. 36 (igii). The master is generally bound to warn the
servant of latent dangers. Wood, Master & Servant, § 354; Bell v. Nor.
Pac.. Ry., 112 Minn. 488 (1910). But if the defect is such .that the servant
could have avoided danger by using ordinary care, he must do so or be
guilty of contributory negligence. Wood, 'Master & Servant, § 335 if.; Ind.
Ry. v. Bundy, 152 Ind. 590 (i899); Louisville Ry. v. Hall, IT5 Ky. 567
(19o3); Holmes v. Penna. Co., 13 Ohio C. C. 397 (1897). There is, however,
generally held to be no duty of inspection on the servant, and he has the
right to assume that the master has performed his duty. 4 Labatt, Master
&'Servant, § 1330 if.; Bird v. Utica Min. Co., 2 Cal. App. 674 (igo6);
McCormick v. Wojciechowski, supra; O'Brien v. Sullivan, 195 Pa. 474 (i9oo).
MASTER AND SERVANT-FEDERAL ElIPLOYERS' LIABILITY AcT-WHEN IS
AN EMPLOYEE ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE?-A track laborer was
injured while loading on a flat car, old steel rails, which had been removed
from the railroad track and left on the right of way beside it to be sold
or stored. The railroad was an interstate carrier and the injury was the
result of a foreman's negligence. Held: Such employee is not engaged in
interstate commerce within the purview of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (Act Apr. 22, 1908, 35 U. S. Stat. at L. 65). Illinois Cent. R. Co. v.
Kelly, 181 S. W. 375 (Ky. i916).
A number of the cases previous to October, 1x15, and the theories
upon which these cases have been decided will be found in the annotation
of Ross v. Sheldon, 154 N. W. 499 (Ia. 1915), in UNIV. oF PENNA. L. REV.,
Vol. 64, p. 312 (Jan. i916). In many cases, the decision is a matter of
degree dependent upon whether the work being done was so closely con-
nected with interstate commerce as to be a part of it and directly related
to it. So one of the great distinctions as to workmen has been whether
they are engaged in construction work, in which case they are without the
act or whether they are engaged in repair or maintenance work, in which
case the contrary is true. Jackson v. Chicago, etc., Rwy. Co., 210 Fed. 495
(1914); Pedersen v. Delaware, etc., Rwy. Co.- 229 U. S. 146 (1913); Holm-
berg v. Lake Shore & M. S. Rwy. Co., 155 N. W. 5o4 (Mich. 195); Vaina
v. Pennsylvania Co., 96 At. 461 (Pa. i9'5).
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Sonic of the cises decided during the past six months present interesting
applications of the rules. In contrast with the principal case, a workman
engaged in putting a rail in the main tracks of an interstate carrier was
held to be engaged in interstate commerce. Cincinnati, etc., Rwy. Co. v.
Tucker, i81 S. W. 94o (Ky. i96). In the following cases, the employees
were held to be within the Act :-where the workman was employed in
cleaning out an ash pit into which ashes from both interstate and intra-
state locomotives were dumped, Grybowski v. Erie R. R., 95 Atd. 764 (N. J.
1915) ; where the injured man was engaged in moving a new outhouse to a
depot used for interstate traffic, there to install it in place of an old one
previously erected, Nash v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., i54 N. W. 957 (Minn.
1915). The following employees were held not to be engaged in inter-
state commerce :-A man engaged in repairing machinery in a shop in
which both interstate and intrastate engines were repaired, Shanks v.
Delaware, etc., R. Co., 36 S. C. Rep. i88 (1915) ; a conductor in charge of a
work train, running intrastate, which collected ties and carried them to X,
from which they were taken to Y to be treated and then used in repairing
tracks both within and without the State, Alexander v. Great Northern
Rwy. Co., 154 Pac. 914 (Mont. 1916); a man injured while repairing an
engine used to haul a work train, running intrastate, but engaged in
repairipg an interstate roadbed, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Carter, 7o So.
65 (Ala. 1915).
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-WHo IS A Dr-
PENDNT?-Some years before his deatfi, deceased had induced his sister to
remain at home aad take charge of the household. Aside from the board
paid by another sister, he paid all the expenses of the house and furnished
the claimant with whatever she needed, and gave her money at regular in-
tervals; there was no agreement as to wages. At the time of his death
she had $6oo in bank, and a one-third interest in a paying property assessed
at $13oo. Held: Claimant was a "dependent," as a basis for compensation,
but in view of her property, she was but "partially dependent." Kenney v. City.
of Boston, xII N. E. 47 (Mass. 1916).
Nearly all the workmen's compensation acts establish classes of per-
sons who are by virtue of their relationship to the decedent conclusively pre-
sumed to have been dependent upon him. Such are usually husbands, wives,
and children within a certain age limit. In the absence of such specific deter-
mination by the act, the question of dependency is one of fact. Herrick's Case,
217 Mass. 1i1 (1914); New Moncton Collieries v. Keeling, 4 B. W. C. C.
332 (Eng. 1911). The test of dependency is not that the contributions of
the decedent were necessary for the support of the claimant, but that the
claimant relied upon th6 contributions for his or her means of living.
Appeal of Bond Co., 93 Atl. 245 (Conn. 1915). The question as to the ex-
tent of the dependency, whole or partial, is also a question of fact. Steven-
son v. Watch Case Co., 186 Il. App. 418 (1914); Caliendo's Case, 219 Mass.
498 (1914); Tamworth Colliery Co. v. Hall, 4 B. W. C. 313 (Eng. 1911).
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See Richelieu v. Union Pac. R. Co., 149 N. NV. 772 (Neb. 1914), a case
very similar to the principal case, arising under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act, annotated in 63 UNiv. OF PENNA. L. Rv., 457.
NFGLIGE."CE-STREET RAILWAYS-PAsSFNGER RIDING ON RuNNING BOARD-
A passenger on a crowded summer street car gave his seat to a lady and
stood on the running sideboard of the car, where his head came in contact
with a pole. Held: He is entitled to the same degree of diligence to pro-
tect him from dangers as the other passengers. Pildish v. Pittsburgh Rys.
Co., 6i Pa. Super. i95 (1915).
The courts are in accord in holding that it is not negligence per ie
for a passenger to stand on the running board of an open car, when the
seats are all occupied. Anderson v. City Ry. Co., 42 Ore. 5o5 (0o3);
Verrone v. Rhode Is. Ry., 27 R. I. 370 (19o5); Horan v. Rockwell, 96 N. Y.
S. 973 (19o6). If the car is crowded so that he is compelled to ride on the
running board with the knowledge and assent of the conductor, he is en-
titled to protection, Timkins v. Phila. R. T. Co., 244 Pa. 182 (914); and
can recover if injured, Hesse v. Meriden, etc., Co., 75 Conn. 571 (1903).
Where a passenger getting on at the front end of a qrowded car is
obliged to walk along the running board to find a seat, he can recover for
injuries caused by the sudden start of the car. Citizens' Ry. Co. v. Meril,
-6 Ind. App. 284 (191o). The question whether there was available space
inside the car is for the jury. Renney v. Webster St. Ry., 5o Pa. Super. 579
(1912). The passenger will generally be regarded as having assumed the risk
of dangers from riding in this position if there is room inside. Moody V.
Springfield St. Ry., 182 Mass. x58 (1902); Burns v. Johnstown Ry., 213 Pa.
143 (9o6). But a passenger in such a position must exercise reasonable
care for his own safety in view of the danger of his exposed position,
and keep a lookout for objects along the track, such as vehicles and posts.
Rosen v. Dry Docks, etc., Ry., 91 N. Y. S. 333 (i9o4); Third Ave. R. Co.
v. Barton, 1o7 Fed. 215 (1901).
PLEADING-STATUTE OF FRAuDs-AD.XIISSBLE UNDER GENERAL DENIAL-
In an action of assumpsit, the general issue was pleaded and the plaintiff
offered to show a parol promise. The defendant objected on the ground
that the Statute of Frauds prevented a recovery on such an oral contract.
Held: The Statute of Frauds was available under the general denial with-
out a special plea. Pocket v. Almon, 96 AtI., 421 (Vt. 1916).
It is a well settled rule in most jurisdictions, that where the plaintiff
bases his cause of action on a contract, which is denied by the defendant,
the latter may avail himself of the Statute of Frauds without specially
pleading it, as the denial of the contract requires the plaintiff first to prove
a valid and enforceable contract, and if the plaintiff attempts to estatlish
a contract which will fall within the Statute of Frauds, the defendant has
the right and opportunity to insist upon the invalidity thereof. Reid v.
Stevens, IO Mass. 209 (1876); Owen v. Riddle, 8I N. J. L. 546 (i91);
Third Nat. Bank v. Steel, 129 Mich. 434 (1902); May v. Sloan, zoi U. S.
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231 (iSfo). There is some authority contra, that the Statute of Frauds
must be specially pleaded. but these cases all recognize the fact that the
common law and the weight of modern authority is the other way. Jones
v. Field. 83 Ala. 445 (18t) ; Suber v. Richards, 61 S. C. 393 (igoi); City
v. Mfg. Co., 93 Tenn. 276 (8o3). Objection to proof of the oral contract,
in addition to a general denial is required in some cases. Henry v. Hilliard,
155 N. C. 372 (1911); Sammers v. NfcGeehan, 43 Mo.. App. 664 (i89i);
Harvester Co. v. Campbell, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 42! (i9o6). In New York
there has been a diversity of decisions, the rule as laid down by the late
cases now appearing to be that a denial of the contract, will not be sufficient
to invoke the Statute. Ilardt v. Recknagel, 62 App. Div. io6, N. Y. (9oi).
The conflict in American cases on the subject is due to the adoption
of the old English chancery rule by some of the courts.. This rule grew
out of and is based on the assumption that a parol *contract within the
Statute had some kind of validity. So chancery required that the Statute
be specially pleaded. Feeny v. Howard, 4 L R. A. 83o (Cal. 189).
SALS-IMPLEn WARRANTY OF F1TNF.SS-SODA FOUNTAIN-In a sale and
installation of a soda fountain it was found that the vendor, also the manu-
facturer, undertook to supply an article adapted to a particular purpose,
but that the contract did not contemplate a definite and known article of
sale on the market. It was entirely unfit. fIeld: The vendee could re-
cover on the breach of an implied warranty that the article would be fit
for the purpose made known to the vendor. Western Cabinet Co. v. Davis,
18r S. W. 273 (Ark. igx6).
The rule is well settled that where an article is supplied for a particular
purpose, the vendor being expressly informed of that purpose and the
vendee relies on the vendor's selection, there is an implied warranty that
the article furnished shall be reasonably fit and suitable for that purpose.
Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, xno U. S. io8 (t884); Morse v. Union
Stock Yards, 21 Oregon 289 (i89x). There is no doubt attaching to 'the
rule where the seller is also the manufacturer. But the American courts
are not in accord where the vendor is only a dealer. The majority
raise no implied warranty in such a circumstance, holding the purchaser as
fully competent to judge as a dealer. White v. Oakes, 88 Me. 367 (ijg6);
Seller v. Stevenson, 163 Pa. 529 (1894). A few states, however, hold the
dealer to an equal responsibility with the manufacturer. Dushane v. Bene-
dict, 120 U. S. 630 (1886). It has been held that the.dealer can undertake
to supply for a particular use the same as a manufacturer and that this
undertaking is the true ground for responsibility. McCaa v. Elam Drug Co.,
21 So. 479 (Ala. 1897). The English rule is clear in adhering to the classi-
fication of Mellor, J., in Jones v. Just, L. R., 3 Q. B. 197 (Eng. 1868),
hich expressly includes a dealer as well as a manufacturer. It has been
held to extend as well to a vendor who is the grower of the article sold.
White v. Miller, V' N. Y. ii8 (1877).
But it is equally as.well settled that where the vendee purchases a
specific, described, or definite article, there is no implied warranty even
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though the vendor knows the purpose or work which the purchaser in-
tends to accomplish with it. Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Co., T41 U. S.
5io (i&ji) ; Davis Calyn Drill Co. v. Mallory, 137 Fed. 332 (r9o4), (but see
the dissenting opinion based more on the application of the law to the
facts than on the law itself) ; Port Carbon Iron Co. v. Groves, 68 Pa. 149
(1871); Jarecki Mfg. Co. v. Kerr, x65 Pa. St. 529 (1895). If, under such
circumstances the vendor assures the vendee it will effect the work such
assurance has been held mere opinion. Davis Co. v. Mallory, supra. This
latter case is held directiy in 'point by the court in the principal case.
SLANIJER-RF.USAL OF COM !UNION TO CHURCH MEMBER-A minister
did not administer communion to a church member but passed by her,
as she stood at the table, without comment. Held: This did not constitute
actionable defamation of character. Carter v. Papineau, fii N. E. 358
(Mass. r916).
The false publication which is essential to the action of defamation has
always been limited to a publication of words or pictures, and mere acts
cannot come within the accepted definition. James Co. v. Bank, Io5 Tenn. x
(i)o) ; Odgers, Libel & Slander (4th Ed.), 13; Burdick, Torts (2nd Ed.),
292. flowever, in Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537 (1913),
where the plaintiff was subjected to ridicule and loss of employment by
reason of his being openly and publicly "shadowed" by the defendant's de-
tectives, such acts of continued and notorious .surveillance were held to
take the place of spoken words and recovery was granted. In the prin-
cipal case there was no continuous act, and although the plaintiff un-
doubtedly suffered mental distress by reason of the omission in the pres-
ence of the other communicants, she was not publicly declared to be "an
open and notorious evil liver." In addition, the act of "passing her by"
without comment was within the discipline of the church, and there was
clearly no ground for actionable defamation of character.
SUNDAY LAWS-AMUSEMENTs-VIOLATION OF STATuTE-Under a statute
which prohibits amusements on Sunday for which an admission fee is
charged, a moving picture show was given at which no admission was
charged, but contributions were solicited for the benefit of a charity after
the actual running expenses of the show were deducted. Held: This was
a violation of the statute. Spooner v. State, 182 S. IV. r12r (Texas i916).
There is such a difference in the language of the Sunday laws in the
various jurisdictions that there is little uniformity in the decisions as to
the legality of any particular Sunday amusement or exhibition. In some
jurisdictions a moving picture show does not come within the inhibition
of such a statute. State v. Chamberlain, 112 Minn. 52 (igio); Clinton v.
Wilson, iOl N. E. 192 (Off. 1913). In others it does. Rosenburg v. Arrow-
smith, 89 At. 24 (N. J: 1913) ; ex parte Zuccaro, 162 S. NV. 844 (Tex. i914).
Such statutes make the exception where the entertainment is given by a
religious or charitable society for their exclusive benefit, and in such a
case only the net receipts need be devoted to the charity. Commonwealth
v. Alexander, 70 N. E. 1017 (Mass. j9o4). But theatrical and other per-
RECENT CASES
formances on Sunday are generally expressly prohibited by statute. Quarles
v. State, 17 S. W. 269 (Ark. ]&6), 14 L. R. A. 19z; Matter of Ham-
merstein, ,08 N. Y. Supp. 197 (19o8). But dancing on Sunday, not as
an exhibition or performance, hut merely for the amusement of the
dancers, does not constitute a violation of such a statute. Matter of Allen,
70 N. Y. Supp. 1017 (1901). Playing baseball o11 Sunday comes within
the inhibition of such statutes in some jurisdictions. Seay v. Shrader, 95
N. W. 69o (Neb. io3); People v. Poole, 89 N. Y. Supp. 773 (i9o4). But
not when'played on private grounds. People v. Dennin, 35 Hun. .327 (N. Y.
1885). 1lowever, fishing on Sunday, even on private grounds, is unlawful.
People v. Moses, 2o N. Y. Supp. 9 (1893). Also the use of a Sunday ex-
cursion boat for hire has been held 'unlawful. Commonwealth v. Rees,
io Pa. Co. Ct. 545 (189,). Such statutes are not unconstitutional as in-
terfering with religious freedom when applied to Jews, "who celebrate the
sabbath day on Saturday. State v. Weiss, 97 Minn. 125 (x9o6).
SURETYSIIIP-COLLATERAL SECURITY-SuDROGATION-The plaintiff was a
surety upon a note given to the defendant, which note was also secured by
a second mortgage upon the debtor's property. The defendant afterwards
misapplied payments made by the debtor. Held: The surety is relieved
from liability to the extent that he has been prejudiced. Patch v. First
National Bank, 96 At. 423 (Vt. i916).
A surety who has been obliged to pay the debt of another is entitled
to resort to all the securities and remedies possessed by the creditor in
order to secure .repayment from the debtor. Houston v. Branch Bank, 25
Ala. 250 (1854) ; People v. Salamon, 184 Ill. 490, 513 (I:oo) ; Leavitt v. Pacific
Railway, go Me. 153 (1897). If the creditor intentionally surrenders or
impairs the security, or negligently loses or parts with the same, his claim
against the surety is reduced pro lanto. Nelson v. Munch, 28 Minn. 314
(i8gi) ; Plankington v. Gorman, 93 Wis. 56o (1896). However, a stranger,
under no obligation to pay and having no interest of his own to protect and
paying without any request by the debtor, is not entitled to be subrogated
to the right of the creditor. Cumberland Loan Assn. v. Sparks, io6 Fed.
ioi (goo); Kocher v. Kocher, 56 N. J. Eq. 547 (i8)8). Nor is a party
entitled to subrogation who has been guilty of fraudulent conduct. Lowry
Banking Co. v. Lumber Co., 9i Ga. 624 (1893); Greig v. Rice, 44 S. E. 729
(S. C. 19o3). Lachcs in asserting this right oT subrogation will forfeit
it as against anyone who is injured by such delay. Mercantile Co. v.
K. and 0. Railway, 58 Fed. 6 (x893); Grings Appeal, 89 Pa. 336 (i879).
Likewise, under no circumstances will a paying surety be given this remedy
if it would prejudice the rights of the creditor or innocent third parties.
Richards v. Griffith, 92 Cal. 493 (i8gi) ; Orvis v. Newell, 17 Conn. 97 0i845).
Nor is the surety entitled to subrogation until the whole of the claim has
been paid. Magee v. Leggett, 48 Miss. 139 (1873); Gannett v. Blodgett, 39
N. H. 150 (1859).
In the absence of special circumstances the -surety has no right to
insist that the creditor resort to security given by the principal debtor
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before demanding payment of the surety. Davis v. Patrick, 57 Fed. 909
(1893); Allen v. Woodward, 125 Mass. 400 (1878); Bingham v. Mears,
4 N. Dak. 437 (1894). In the principal case the court treats the surety's
right against the creditor as one of exoneration, whereas, strictly speaking,
exoneration is the right of a surety to force the principal debtor to make
payment after maturity of the debt, even though no demand has been
made on the surety. Holcomb v. Fetter, 70 N. J. Eq. 3oo (i9o5); Norton
v. Reid, It S. C. 593 (1867).
TAXATION-"I9NHABITAN.T"-ARfY OFFICeR-A New Hampshire statute
(Laws, N. H. 1913, C. 82,, § x), provides that every male inhabitant of the
state shall be taxed a certain amount. A officer in the coast artillery branch
of the United States Army, whose domicile of origin was in New York,
where he returned at the expiration of each term of enlistment, was sta.
tioned at a fort located in New Hampshire. After his marriage to a
New Hampshire woman, he maintained an apartment in the city of Ports-
mouth, because of the lack of facilities at the fort, and by special permission
spent several nights a week in the city. Held: The word "inhabitant"
means one domiciled in the state. The officer was not domiciled at Ports-
mouth, because the "element of more or less permanency" was lacking,
since his military duties were likely to call him away at Any time. Ex parte
White, 228 Fed. 88 (1916).
While the distinction between "residence" and "domicile" is clearly
defined, Long v. Ryan, 30 Gratt. 718 (Va. 1878); Minor: Conflict of Laws,
Ed. 1901, § 20, there is considerable difference of opinion as to the exact,
meaning of "inhabitancy." In a statute dealing with the administration of
decedent's estates, inhabitancy was held to connote something different
from domicile. Holmes v. Oregon & C. A. Co., 5 Fed. 523 (1881). So also
in a divorce statute. Wallace v. Wallace, 62 N. J. Eq. 509 (i9o!). On the
other hand, a number of cases regard inhabitancy and domicile as syn-
onymous. Borland v. City of Boston, 132 Mass. 89 (1882); Stockton v.
Staples, 66 Me. 197 (1877); Woodward v. Isham, 43 Vt. 123 (1870); Cul-
bertson v. Board of Commissioners of Floyd County, 52 Ind. 361 (1876).
Aside from this question of construction, which is purely one of rnu-
nicipal law, there is involved in the principal case the problem of -private
international law relating to the circumstances under which a domicile of
choice may be acquired. Two different tests have been prescribed. One
requires actual residence at a particular place accompanied by an intention
of continuing there indefinitely. Bell v. Kennedy, L. R. I H. Lds. 307 (Scot.
1868). The other requires actual residence at a place without any present in-
tention of removing therefrom. Putnam v. Johnson, io Mass. 488 (1813). The
court in the principal case applied the former test, holding that the army
officer had no intention of remaining indefinitely in New Hampshire, be-
cause his military calling might necessitate his immediate departure at
any time, and that he had therefore not- acquired a domicile in that state.
Cf. Attorney-General v. Pottinger, 6 H1. & N. 733 (Eng. 1861); State v.
Judge, 13 Ala. Bus (08i) ; Brewer v. Linnaeus, 36 Me. 428 (1853).
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TORTS-DA.ArEs-MENTAL SUFFF.RINc-Mental suffering from shame
and humiliation, experienced by a woman who was assaulted in the pres-
ence of her neighbors, is general damage and may be recovered in an
action for the assault without special allegation. Rogers v. Bigelow, 96
At. 417 (Vt. 1916).
It is generally held that in actions for intentional wrongs damages
are recoverable for mental suffering consisting in a sense of wrong, or
insult, indignity, humiliation or injury to the feelings. Rwy. Co. v. Williams,
5 Ill. 185 (187o); Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 6o2 (19o2); Leavitt v. Dow,
ioS Me. 5o (irgo); and 'this rule is particularly applicable where such
suffering is the result of intentional trespass upon the person of a woman.
Lonergan v. Small, 8r Kan. 48 (igio); Kurpgewist v. Kirby, 88 Neb. 72
(191o). The mental suffering must be real and not merely sentimental.
Jenson v. Rwy. Co., 86 Wis. s8g (1894). In some states such damages are
awarded because an intention to hurt the feelings will be inferred
Spade v. Rwy. Co., 168 Mass. 285 (1897). The material damage may be
trivial, Kimball v. Holms, 6o N. H. 163 (188o); but many states hold that
damages cannot be recovered for mere mental distress when not accom-
panied by some physical injury. Ewing v. Rwy., 147 Pa. 40 (1892); Wilcox
v. Rwy., 52 Fed. 264 (1892); Pankopf v. Hinkly, 141 Wis. 146 (ig9o). But
many jurisdictions have repudiated this rule and hold that damages are
recoverable for mental suffering caused by a wrongful, intentional act,
even though there be no physical injury. Carmichael v. Telan Co., 157
N. C. 2r (r93) ; Cowen v. Tel. Co., 122 Ia. 379 (i9o4) ; Larson v. Chase,
47 Minn. 307 (i891). Davis v. Rwy. Co., 35 Wash. 203 (i9o4). Damages
awarded because of insult, indignity and the like are sometimes called-
"solatlim" to distinguish them from compensatory damages. Saunders v.
Gilbert, 156 N. C. 463 (19TI). In other states damages for humiliation are
regarded as exemplary. Bank v. Morey, 113 Ky. 857 (1902); Borland v.
Barrett, 76 Va. 128 (1882). But it is the general rule that humiliation is
an element of general rather than special damage, and so need not be
specially alleged. Fink v. Busch, 83 Neb. 599 (igo8); Knoche v. Knoche,
x6o Mo. App. 257 (19II); Rwy. v. Dickey, 3 Ky. Law. Rep. 894 (io8).
TORTS-MASTER AND SERvANT-"VxcE PRNcrPAL"-An employee engaged
in the work of razing a house was fatally injured through the negligence of
the foreman in charge of the work. Held: The master was not liable
as the foreman did not have the power to hire or discharge his subordinates,
which is necessary to constitute one a vice principal. Reid v. Medley's
Adm'r, 87 S. E. 616 (Va. i916).
Several of the American courts have adopted the doctrine that all
superior servants are vice principals as regards their subordinates. Wilson
v. Counsell, 182 II. App. 79 (1914); Hunn v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 44
N. W. 5o2 (Mich. 1889). This idea has produced endless confusion in the
decisions, and it is. difficult to ascertain the rationale of the doctrine. It is
because of the obligation of a servant to obey his superior according to
some courts. Turner v. Goldsboro Lumber Co., i19 N. C. 387 (1896).
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Others say becatuse the duty to use care in giving orders is one of the
non-assignable duties of the master. Miller v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., ig S.
W. 58 (Mo. i8gi). This doctrine has been unequivocally repudiated by
the great majority of the American courts. Meehan v. Speirs Mfg. Co.,
52 N. E. 518 (Mass. 1899); Kiflin v. Wendt, 57 N. Y. Supp. to9 (1899);
Durst v. Carnegie Steel Co., 173 Pa. 162 (1896). However, in some states
departmiental managers and superintendents are held to be vice principals.
Prevost v. Citizens' Ice & Refrigerating Co., 185 Pa. 617 (i898); Alaska
Treadwell Gold Mining Co. v. Whelan, I68 U. S. 86 (1897). But a mere
foreman of subordinate grade is not converted into a vice principal by
the fact that, among his powers, is included that of hiring and discharging.
Alaska Treadwell. Gold Mining'Co. v. Whelan, supra; Gilmore v,. Oxford
Iron & Nail Co., 25 At. 707 (N. J. 1892); thus contra to the principal
case. However, it is universally agreed that the general rules of the law
of agency are controlling in all cases to this extent,-that if the act was
within the scope of such employee's authority, the master cannot escape
liability on the ground that it was done in direct violation of his orders.
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Randall, 19 Pac. 783 (Kan. x888).
It is well to note, that the liability of the employer in any of these
cases is no longer a matter of doubt in those states which have passed
workmen's compensation acts.
TRUSTS-SPENDTIIRIrFT TRUSTS-ATTACHMENT FOR SUPPORT OF CaILD oy
Cestui que Trust-The Commonwealth attached a spendthrift trust fund,
held for a beneficiary who failed to support his child, as directed by the
court. Held: The attachment was permissible under the Act of April x5,
1913, P. L 72. Com. v. Cozens, 25 Dist. R. s7" (Pa. igx6).
It is a general rule that the same incidents attach to an equitable interest
as to a legal title, and in strict theory no trust can be created with the
proviso that the interest of the cestui que trust shall not be charged with
his debts. Such is the law in England and a few American jurisdictions.
Jones v. Reese, 65 Ala. I34 (188o); Adair v. Adair, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 857
(i9o7). But this so-called English doctrine concedes that the donor may
pass an estate which will terminate upon the bankruptcy of the beneficiary
or upon due attempt of the latter to alienate. Heath v. Bishop, 4 Rich.
Eq. 46 (S. C. i85t). And a trust may be created which vests no interest
in the beneficiary, as where the trustees may apply the fund at their
discretion. Davidson v. Kemper, 79 Ky. 5 (i88o). Moreover, the trust
fund cannot be attached when the interest of the debtor is not separable
from the interests of the other beneficiaries. Hackett v. Hackett, 146 Ky.
408 (1912). In most jurisdictions the American doctrine has been adopted,
and spendthrift trusts are held valid, free from the attachment of creditors
of the cestui que trust. Nichols v. Eaton, gr U. S. 716 (i875) ; White v.
Williams, 172 11. App. 630 (1913); Holbrook's Estate, 2r3 Pa. 93 (i9o5).
While the spendthrift trust usually creates a life interest,.it may be for a
shorter period. Siegwarth's Estate, 22,6 Pa. 59t (191o). And the beneficiary
may devise his interest. Fleming's Estate, 219 Pa. 422 (i9o8). A spend-
thrift trust is not created if the beneficiary is given any control over the
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estate. Croom v. Ocala Co., 57 So. 243 (Fla. zqgx); Morgan's Estate, 223
Pa. 228 (igog). And a settlor can never create such a trust for his own
benefit in order to defeat his creditors. Ullman v. Cameron, x86 N. Y. 339
(igo6); Nolan v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135 (1907). In Michigan the surplus
over what is needed for the maintenance of the spendthrift is liable for
the cestuis debts. Spring v. Randall, zo7 Mich. IO3 (x895). In New York
only a small percentage of the trust fund is exempted by statute. Brearley
School v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358 (i9tz).
In Pennsylvania, prior to the Act of 19T3, the spendthrift trust fund
was not attachable by any creditor of the ceslui que trust, even to enforce
the payment of alimony. Thackara v. Mintier, ioo Pa. 151 (1882); or
for the support of the beneficiary's wife and children. Phila. v. Lockard,
198 Pa. 572 (igoi). This has been changed by the statute, which, while
retroactive, is declared constitutional in the principal case.
